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Boorman v. Nevada Memorial Cremation Society and Clark County Coroner’s Office
126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29 (July 29, 2010) 1
TORT LAW
Summary
Answers to the following questions concerning causes of action for negligent handling of
a deceased person’s remains either by a mortuary or the county coroner: 1. What relationship the
plaintiff must have to a deceased person to assert a claim for emotional distress related to
mishandling of the deceased person’s remains; 2. Whether the plaintiff must observe or have a
sensory perception of the act causing insult to their loved one’s remains; 3. Whether the plaintiff
must demonstrate physical impact or serious emotional distress causing physical illness; and 4.
Whether a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or parts exists under Nevada law.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court held: 1. Close family members who are aware that mortuary services are being
performed have standing to assert an emotional distress claim against a mortuary related to the
mishandling of a deceased person’s remains. Moreover, only the person with the right to dispose
of the body has standing to assert an emotional distress claim against the county coroner for
negligent handling of the deceased person’s remains; 2. Persons who assert such claims need not
observe or perceive the negligent conduct; 3. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate any physical
manifestation of emotional distress; and 4. Nevada does not recognize claims for conversion of
deceased human remains or body parts.
Factual and Procedural History
Denise Boorman asserted claims in United States District Court against Nevada
Memorial Cremation Society and the Clark County Coroner’s Office for emotional distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, related to alleged mishandling of her son Richard’s
body.
Richard Boorman died from excessive consumption of drugs and alcohol while
vacationing in Las Vegas. The Clark County Coroner conducted an autopsy, during which
Richard’s internal organs were removed. Subsequently, Nevada Memorial Cremation Society’s
mortuary embalmed Richard’s body before it was shipped to his native England. Upon its arrival
in England, English authorities were unable to locate any of Richard’s internal organs and found
his body cavity stuffed with rolled cloth.
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada certified ten questions relating
to causes of action for negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains. 2 The Nevada
Supreme Court consolidated the ten questions into three inquiries.
1

By David Krawczyk.
The ten questions presented were as follows: 1.What relationship must a plaintiff have to a deceased person to
assert a cognizable emotional distress claim related to the alleged mishandling of the deceased person’s remains? 2.
In asserting such a claim, must the plaintiff demonstrate physical impact or serious emotional distress causing
physical injury or illness? 3. In asserting such a claim, must the plaintiff observe or have some sensory perception of
the act causing insult to their loved one’s remains? 4. Does a county coroner’s office owe a duty to the family
members of a deceased individual not to lose, misplace, or misappropriate the deceased person’s organs such that
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Discussion
First, the Court considered the requirements for bringing an emotional distress claim
related to a mortuary’s mishandling of a deceased person’s remains. Second, the Court
considered the requirements for bringing a claim for emotional distress related to a county
coroner’s mishandling of a deceased person’s remains. Third, the Court considered whether a
claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts is cognizable under Nevada law.
Requirements for bringing a claim for emotional distress related to a mortuary’s mishandling of
a deceased person’s remains
Close family members may bring a cause of action for emotional distress resulting from a
mortuary’s negliect handling of a deceased person’s remains if they are aware of the loved one’s
death and knew that the mortuary performed services. Adopting the reasoning of Christensen v.
Superior Court, 3 the Court concluded that limiting emotional distress claims only to persons who
have the statutory right to control disposition of the body could bar family members close to the
decedent, who potentially suffer the greatest emotional distress, from bringing cognizable
emotional distress claims. Moreover, recognizing that there must be limited parties to which a
mortuary is liable, the Court held that a mortuary’s duty does not run to all persons potentially
affected by the decedent’s passing such as close friends and distant relatives.
Plaintiffs who assert claims for emotional distress related to a mortuary’s mishandling of
a deceased person’s remains need not observe or perceive the negligent conduct. The Court
observed that requiring a potential plaintiff to observe the negligent conduct would essentially
grant immunity to persons who mishandle a deceased person’s remains because a mortuary’s
activities occur mostly behind closed doors.
While plaintiffs asserting claims for emotional distress must allege some emotional
disturbance resulting from the defendant’s negligent conduct, there is no need to demonstrate any
physical manifestation of that emotional distress. Whether a close family member should be able
to recover any damages in such an action is a question for the trier of fact.
Requirements for bringing a claim for emotional distress related to a county coroner’s
mishandling of a deceased person’s remains
A county coroner’s duty is not as expansive as the duty of a mortuary. Unlike a
mortuary, which undertakes a duty to perform funeral services voluntarily, the county coroner is
obligated by law to perform its services. The county coroner’s duty is to investigate cause of
death, a process which may involve removal and dissection of the deceased person’s internal
organs. While a bereaved may be emotionally upset because the deceased person’s remains are
the county coroner’s office could be liable for emotional distress claims? 5. If the answer to question four is yes, to
what class of persons is such a duty owed? 6. Does a county coroner’s office owe a fiduciary duty to the family
members of a deceased individual not to lose, misplace, or misappropriate the deceased person’s organs, or to
inform the family members about the whereabouts of such organs? 7. If the answer to question six is yes, to what
class of persons is such a duty owed? 8. Does a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts exist
under Nevada law? 9. If the answer to question eight is yes, what class of persons may bring such a claim? 10. If the
answer to question eight is yes, may such a plaintiff recover emotional distress damages arising out of the
conversion of the human remains?
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Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).

not returned with all of its organs, the Court concluded the county coroner cannot be held liable
for carrying out the duties of his job.
However, relying on Morton v. Maricopa County, 4 the Court held that a county coroner
has a narrow, limited, duty to account for a deceased person’s remains and may be held liable for
emotional distress to the person with the statutory right to dispose of the body in certain
circumstances. The remaining elements required to prevail on an emotional distress claim
against a county coroner are the same as those relating to an emotional distress claim against a
mortuary. The plaintiff need not either observe or perceive the offending act, or demonstrate any
physical manifestation of emotional distress.
Nevada law does not recognize a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts
Conversion is defined as “a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s
personal property in denial of , or inconsistent with, his title or rights therein…” 5 Therefore, the
Court’s inquiry focused on whether a deceased human body or its parts is “personal property” to
support a claim for conversion.
Consistent with a majority of jurisdictions, the Court held that there is no property right
in deceased human remains. The Court expressed concern that finding a “personal property”
right in a deceased human body may create an incentive for the person with a right to the
disposition of the body to sell the deceased person’s remains for profit.
Conclusion
Close family members who are aware both of their loved one’s death and that mortuary
services are being performed have standing to assert an emotional distress claim against a
mortuary related to its mishandling of a deceased person’s remains. However, an emotional
distress claim against the county coroner for negligent handling of a deceased’s remains may
only be asserted by the person with the statutory right to dispose of the remains. Persons who
assert such claims against either mortuaries or the county coroner need not observe or perceive
the negligent conduct. Additionally, plaintiffs need not demonstrate any physical impact or
physical manifestation of emotional distress. Nevada law does not recognize any claims for
conversion of deceased human remains or body parts.
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Morton v. Maricopa County, 865 P.2d 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 116 Nev. 598, 606, 5 P.3d 1043, 1048 (2000).
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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, C.J.:
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada certified ten questions relating
to causes of action for the alleged negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains.[1] The
first three questions generally ask us to decide who may assert a cognizable emotional distress
claim for the alleged negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains and to determine the
necessary requirements to assert such a claim, without distinguishing between the defendant
actors involved in this action. Because our answer necessarily depends upon identifying the
alleged negligent actor, we must re-craft those questions to focus on the two actors involved—a
mortuary and the county coroner. As a result of this re-crafting, we do not view it necessary to
separately answer the questions relating to a county coroner’s duty not to lose, misplace, or
misappropriate the deceased person’s organs. In our view, the question of whether a county
coroner owes duty not to lose, misplace, or misappropriate a deceased person’s organs is
consumed within the question of whether the county coroner owes a duty not to negligently
handle a deceased person’s remains.
We therefore rephrase the ten certified questions to focus on three primary inquires.[2]
See, e.g., Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., Ltd., 118 Nev. 943, 945, 59 P.3d 1237, 1238 (2002)
(rephrasing certified questions under NRAP 5).
The first primary inquiry focuses on the mortuary. Specifically, what relationship must a
plaintiff have to a deceased person to assert a cognizable emotional distress claim related to the
alleged mishandling of the deceased person’s remains by a mortuary? Must the plaintiff observe
or have some sensory perception of the act causing insult to their loved one’s remains? And
must the plaintiff demonstrate physical impact or serious emotional distress causing physical
injury or illness?
The second primary inquiry is much like the first but focuses on the county coroner.
Specifically, what relationship must a plaintiff have to a deceased person to assert a cognizable
emotional distress claim related to the alleged mishandling of the deceased person’s remains by a
county coroner? Must the plaintiff observe or have some sensory perception of the act causing
insult to their loved one’s remains? And must the plaintiff demonstrate physical impact or
serious emotional distress causing physical injury or illness?

The third primary inquiry is whether a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or
its parts exist under Nevada law.
We answer these three questions as follows. First, close family members who were
aware of the death of a loved one and to whom mortuary services were being provided may
assert an emotional distress claim for the negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains
against a mortuary. Those persons do not need to observe or have any sensory perception of the
offensive conduct, and do not need to present evidence of any physical manifestation of
emotional distress. Second, the only person who may assert an emotional distress claim against
a county coroner for the negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains is the person with the
superior right to dispose of the decedent’s body. That person does not need to observe or have
any sensory perception of the offensive conduct, and does not need to present evidence of any
physical manifestation of emotional distress. Third, a claim for conversion of a deceased human
body or its parts does not exist under Nevada law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
These certified questions arise from a federal district court action brought by appellants
Denise Boorman (Richard Boorman’s mother) and other family members (collectively,
Boorman) against respondents Nevada Memorial Cremation Society (the mortuary), Clark
County, and the employees of both entities, for returning Richard Boorman’s (Richard) body to
England without its internal organs.
Richard, a 29-year-old from London, England, died from what appeared to be an
excessive consumption of alcohol and drugs while he was vacationing in Las Vegas for a
bachelor party. Following his death, his body was transported to the Clark County Coroner for
an autopsy, where the county coroner removed the internal organs for examination. The county
coroner contends that the organs were then placed in a plastic bag between Richard’s legs, and
that after the autopsy was complete, Richard’s body and its internal organs were sent to the
mortuary. After the mortuary embalmed Richard’s body, it sent his remains back to England.
Upon receipt of his body, Boorman contends that the English authorities opened up
Richard’s body cavity to discover that all the internal organs had been removed and replaced
with a rolled up cloth sheet. To date, Richard’s organs have not been located.
Based upon these facts, Boorman filed an action in United States District Court for the
District of Nevada alleging, among other things, that respondents were liable for claims of
emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion for the negligent handling of
Richard’s body. The federal district court concluded that no controlling Nevada authority
existed with regard to Boorman’s claims and certified ten questions for this court to answer,
which we accepted.[3]
DISCUSSION
Inquiry related to the mortuary

Boorman argues that close family members who are aware that mortuary services are
being performed should have standing to assert an emotional distress claim for the alleged
negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains. Boorman further argues that those persons
need not observe the offending acts or demonstrate any physical manifestation to succeed on
such a claim. We agree.
This court has never had the opportunity to address the specific factual scenario raised in
appellants’ federal complaint. While we have recognized that an individual may have a cause of
action for emotional distress in other contexts, see, e.g., Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev.
441, 447-48, 956 P.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1998) (concluding that direct victims of negligent conduct
may bring a claim for emotional distress); Grotts v. Zahner, 115 Nev. 339, 340, 989 P.2d 415,
416 (1999) (recognizing witness-bystander claims for emotional distress), we have never been
presented with the opportunity to discuss the scope of an emotional distress claim resulting from
the alleged negligent handling of a deceased person’s remains.
Although we have not addressed this issue in Nevada, the negligent handling of a
deceased person’s remains is a commonly recognized tort. For example, the California Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Christensen v. Superior Court, which is helpful to our discussion.
820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
In Christensen, friends and relatives of the decedent brought an emotional distress cause
of action against a mortuary and crematory for negligently and intentionally mishandling the
deceased’s remains. See id. at 184-85 (alleging that mortuary and crematory defendants
harvested decedent’s body parts and organs). In determining the class of persons who may assert
such a claim, the California Supreme Court rejected the limitation that only those persons who
have the statutory right to control the disposition of the body and who contract for its disposition
may assert an emotional distress claim. Id. at 183. That class of persons “is not a reliable
indicator of the family members who may suffer the greatest emotional distress if the decedent’s
remains are mishandled.” Id. at 191.
Instead, the Court reasoned that “[o]ne of several children of the decedent may arrange
for the services on behalf of all siblings, as well as a surviving spouse or parent of the decedent
[and, i]f so, the crematory or mortuary assumes a duty to all of these family members.”[4] Id. at
191. By undertaking such a duty, mortuary and crematory operators “create[ ] a special
relationship obligating them to perform [funeral] services in the dignified and respectful manner
the bereaved expect . . . .” Id. at 193. Therefore, the Court concluded that such a defendant
owes a duty to “close family members who were aware that funeral and/or crematory services
were being performed, and on whose behalf or for whose benefit the services were rendered.”
Id. at 183.
We are persuaded by the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Christensen as it
relates to what class of person may assert an emotional distress claim against a mortuary.
Unlike the duty of a county coroner, which we discuss in the next section, a mortuary
voluntarily undertakes a duty to competently prepare the decedent’s body for the benefit of the
bereaved. See Christensen, 820 P.2d at 193. While we must limit liability at some point, and

thus conclude that a mortuary’s duty does not run to all persons potentially affected by the
decedent’s passing, such as close friends and distant relatives, we cannot conclude that a
mortuary only owes a duty to the person with the right to dispose of the body.
Limiting recovery for emotional distress damages to the person with the right to dispose
of the body would be an arbitrary delineation. See id. at 191. Certainly, in some instances the
person with the right to dispose of the body would arguably suffer emotional distress upon
learning about the negligent treatment of a loved one’s body. However, in many other instances,
a close family member who is not the person with the right to dispose of the body may be more
affected by such negligent conduct. Therefore, we conclude that close family members who are
aware of both the death of a loved one and that mortuary services were being performed may
bring an action for emotional distress resulting from the negligent handling of the deceased’s
remains.
We further conclude that persons who may assert such a claim do not need to observe or
perceive the negligent conduct, or demonstrate any physical manifestation of emotional distress.
Requiring a potential plaintiff to observe or perceive the negligent conduct would essentially
grant immunity to persons who negligently handle a deceased’s remains in many instances
because the activities of a mortuary mostly occur behind closed doors. See Contreraz v.
Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1122 (Mont. 1995) (requiring a potential plaintiff to be
present or observe the offending act “is an unreasonable and arbitrary limitation” and
“[u]pholding such a rule would create an immunity that could protect mortuaries from their
egregious conduct while barring recovery to those persons possibly suffering the greatest harm”).
Also, our historical concern that emotional distress must be demonstrated by some
physical manifestation of emotional distress is not implicated in this context. We need not
question the trustworthiness of an individual’s emotional anguish in cases involving desecration
of a loved one’s remains. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §
54, at 362 (5th ed. 1984) (“[A group of cases eliminating the physical manifestation requirement]
has involved the negligent mishandling of corpses . . . [because there is] . . . an especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, . . . which serves as a guarantee that the claim
is not spurious.”); Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that
“damages are recoverable . . . without physical injury for negligent mishandling of a corpse”);
Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 44 (Idaho 1990) (exempting the physical
manifestation of emotional distress requirement in cases involving the negligent handling of a
deceased person’s remains).
Therefore, while a plaintiff must allege some emotional disturbance resulting from the
defendant’s negligent conduct, there is no need to demonstrate any physical manifestation of that
emotional distress. Ultimately, the determination of whether a close family member should be
able to recover any damages in such an action is a question for the trier of fact.[5]
Inquiry related to the county coroner
Despite our conclusion in the previous section, we cannot conclude that the duty of a
county coroner is as expansive as the duty of a mortuary. Unlike a mortuary, which voluntarily

undertakes a duty to perform funeral services on behalf of the bereaved, a county coroner is
obligated by law to perform its services. See NRS 259.050(1) (requiring the coroner to “make an
appropriate investigation” when there are “reasonable ground[s] to suspect that [a] death has
been occasioned by unnatural means”). The county coroner does not create a special relationship
nor does he or she undertake any particular duty to the bereaved to prepare the deceased’s body
for funeral services.[6] Rather, the county coroner’s duty is to investigate the cause of death and,
so performing its duty, there may be instances where a county coroner needs to examine the
body or its parts.[7]
Nevertheless, a county coroner is not completely absolved from any liability. A county
coroner has a narrow limited duty to account for a deceased person’s remains and may be held
liable for emotional distress to the person with the right to dispose of the deceased’s body for
negligently handling a deceased person’s remains.
We find the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Morton v. Maricopa County, 865 P.2d
808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), particularly helpful to our decision. In Morton, the court recognized
that a county coroner owed a duty not to negligently prevent the proper interment or cremation of
a deceased’s body but that the duty was only owed to the person with the right to dispose of the
deceased’s body. Id. at 812. The Morton court quoted section 868 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in recognizing that a county coroner could be held liable:
“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon
the body of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a
member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”
Morton, 865 P.2d at 812 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868 (1979)). The Morton
court further acknowledged that “‘[t]here is no need to show physical consequences of the
mental distress.’” See id. at 812 n.2 (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868 cmt. a).
We agree with Morton and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 868 that the only
person who can assert an emotional distress claim against a county coroner in this context is the
person with the right to dispose of the body. While the only person who may assert this claim is
the person with the right to dispose of the body, the remaining elements required to prevail on
this claim are the same as those relating to an emotional distress claim against a mortuary—the
person need not perceive the offending act or demonstrate any physical manifestations of
emotional distress.
Does a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts exist under Nevada law?
A claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts does not exist under
Nevada law.
Conversion is defined as “a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s
personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with his title or rights therein or in derogation,
exclusion, or defiance of such title or rights.” Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 116 Nev.
598, 606, 5 P.3d 1043, 1048 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the essential question

before us is whether a deceased human body or its parts is “personal property” in order to
support a claim for conversion.
Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, we cannot
conclude that there is a property right in a deceased human body or its remains. See, e.g., Shults
v. U.S., 995 F. Supp. 1270, 1275-76 (D. Kan. 1998) (construing that Mississippi law did not
support a claim for conversion and noting that “the partial remains of a human body[ ] has no
compensable value”); Culpepper v. Pearl Street Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994)
(“We formally reject the fictional theory that a property right exists in a dead body that would
support an action for conversion.”); Walser v. Resthaven, 633 A.2d 466, 477 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993).[8] Concluding otherwise may create morbid consequences, setting up an incentive
for the person with the right to the disposition of the body to sell his or her loved one’s remains
for profit. We therefore answer this question in the negative and conclude that Nevada law does
not recognize a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts.
We therefore answer the certified questions as set forth above.

HARDESTY, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, SAITTA, GIBBONS, and PICKERING, JJ., concur.

**********FOOTNOTES**********
[1]

The ten certified questions were presented to us as follows:

1. What relationship must a plaintiff have to a deceased person to assert a cognizable emotional
distress claim related to the alleged mishandling of the deceased person’s remains?
2. In asserting such a claim, must the plaintiff demonstrate physical impact or serious emotional
distress causing physical injury or illness?
3. In asserting such a claim, must the plaintiff observe or have some sensory perception of the
act causing insult to their loved one’s remains?
4. Does a county coroner’s office owe a duty to the family members of a deceased individual not
to lose, misplace, or misappropriate the deceased person’s organs such that the county coroner’s
office could be liable for emotional distress claims?
5. If the answer to question four is yes, to what class of persons is such a duty owed?
6. Does a county coroner’s office owe a fiduciary duty to the family members of a deceased
individual not to lose, misplace, or misappropriate the deceased person’s organs, or to inform the
family members about the whereabouts of such organs?

7. If the answer to question six is yes, to what class of persons is such a duty owed?
8. Does a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts exist under Nevada law?
9. If the answer to question eight is yes, what class of persons may bring such a claim?
10. If the answer to question eight is yes, may such a plaintiff recover emotional distress
damages arising out of the conversion of the human remains?
[2]
In its certification order, the federal district court noted that it did “not intend its framing
of the questions to limit [this court’s] consideration of the issues.”
[3]
We note that respondents Nevada Memorial Cremation Society and its employees have
failed to participate in this matter.
[4]

The Court further stated that

[t]here is no reason to assume that a person who makes the arrangements is any more susceptible
to emotional distress if the services are not competently performed than are the other family
members. Indeed, in light of the emotional impact of the death of a close family member of the
bereaved, it may be the relative least affected who is chosen by the family to represent them in
arranging for funeral and related services.
Id. at 191.
[5]
Similar to our resolution of this issue, the American Law Institute is drafting a new
section in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
addressing this situation, which currently reads:
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional disturbance to another is
subject to liability to the other if the conduct:
...
(b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships
in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional disturbance.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2007). The tentative draft Restatement limits recovery under this tort to a class of persons
“in the relationship or those for whom the undertaking or activity was being performed . . . .” Id.
§ 46 cmt. b. The tentative draft does not mention any requirement that the person bringing the
claim must observe or perceive the negligent conduct. This rule is not limited to cases in which
there are physical manifestations; the only requirement is that the potential plaintiff demonstrate
serious emotional distress. See id. § 46 cmt. g.

[6]
Because a county coroner does not create a special relationship with family members of
the deceased, we answer the question of whether a county coroner owes a fiduciary duty not to
lose, misplace, or misappropriate a deceased person’s organs, or to inform family members of
the organs’ whereabouts, in the negative.
[7]
For example, a coroner may need to dissect a deceased’s organs and dispose of body
parts after the investigation. While a bereaved may be emotionally upset that the deceased body
is not returned with all of its organs, the county coroner cannot be held liable for carrying out the
duties of his or her job.
[8]
While some jurisdictions have adopted the theory that a person has a “quasi-property”
right to a deceased human body or its remains for burial purposes, most of those jurisdictions
have refused to apply that theory to support a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or
its parts. See, e.g., Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); Bauer v. North Fulton Medical Center, 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999).

